Policy Considerations for Implementing Gun Liability Insurance in North Carolina by Madan, Anuradha
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Policy Considerations for Implementing Gun Liability Insurance in North Carolina 
 
Prepared for: North Carolinians Against Gun Violence 
 
Prepared By: Anuradha Madan 
Master of Public Policy Candidate 
The Sanford School of Public Policy 
Duke University 
 
 Faculty Advisor: Philip J. Cook  
 
April 18, 2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Disclaimer:  This student paper was prepared in 2014 in partial completion of the requirements for the Master’s 
Project, a major assignment for the Master of Public Policy Program at the Sanford School of Public Policy at 
Duke University.  The research, analysis, and policy alternatives and recommendations contained in this paper are 
the work of the student who authored the document, and do not represent the official or unofficial views of the 
Sanford School of Public Policy or of Duke University.  Without the specific permission of its author, this paper may 
not be used or cited for any purpose other than to inform the client organization about the subject matter.  The 
author relied in many instances on data provided by the client and related organizations and makes no independent 
representations as to the accuracy of the data. 
 
 
 ii 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Policy Question 
 
Would a gun liability insurance requirement reduce gun violence in North Carolina and 
ensure compensation for victims of gun violence?  Specifically, how would a liability insurance 
requirement for concealed carry permit holders reduce gun violence and provide compensation 
for shooting victims? 
 
Problem (p. 3) 
 
Gun violence in the United States has declined in the last 20 years, but is still 
unacceptably high.  In 2011 alone, over 32,000 people died as a result of firearms.  That same 
year, over 3,500 North Carolinians were injured or killed in gun-related assaults and accidents.   
 
In response to the tragic events at Newtown, Connecticut, that resulted in the death of 
twenty children and six school personnel, several proposals were introduced in legislatures 
across the nation to curb gun violence.  Among them was the proposal to require gun owners to 
purchase gun liability insurance.  
 
To date, nine states have considered mandatory gun liability insurance legislation.  The 
primary goal of such legislation is to compensate victims of gun violence.  Financial 
compensation for harm done is a well-established principle of our insurance law system.  For 
decades, lawmakers have required drivers in their states to purchase automobile insurance to 
provide compensation for any damage or bodily injury their vehicles may cause.  Gun liability 
insurance would work in a similar fashion.   
 
Firearms, even in the hands of responsible and law-abiding gun owners, increase the risk 
of serious injury to others.  An insurance mandate for firearms would help shift the economic 
costs of gun violence away from victims and taxpayers and onto those who possess firearms.  
Currently, some victims of gun violence have access to monetary compensation, such as the tort 
system, victims compensation programs, homeowners insurance, automobile insurance, and 
National Rifle Association (NRA) sponsored insurance.  However, these programs are 
inadequate, as some do not cover intentional acts of gun violence while others provide minimal 
and insufficient compensation.  In any event, in most cases, there is no compensation because the 
shooter is unknown, or if known, is judgment proof. 
 
A secondary goal of a gun liability insurance mandate would be to reduce gun violence.  
By requiring gun owners to purchase liability insurance for their firearms, some high-risk people 
may be deterred from possessing an arsenal of dangerous weapons.   
 
Alternatives (p. 18) 
 
Lawmakers must consider the following policy options when considering a gun liability 
insurance mandate: 
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• Should the mandate cover injuries and deaths resulting from (1) unintentional shootings 
only or (2) intentional and unintentional shootings? 
• Should the mandate apply to (1) concealed carry permit holders only or (2) to all gun 
owners in North Carolina? 
• Should the mandate apply to (1) new firearms purchased after the mandate is enacted or 
(2) to all firearms? 
 
Criteria (p. 21) 
 
• Cost-Benefit Analysis (Maximize compensation for victims and reduce gun violence, and 
minimize costs to insurers and gun owners) 
• Maximize Political Feasibility 
• Ensure Constitutionality 
 
Analysis (p. 22) 
 
 The analysis seeks to balance compensation for victims and costs, political feasibility, 
and constitutionality of each policy option.  All policy options will likely be deemed 
constitutional since neither of the alternatives restricts an individual’s right to possess a firearm 
for lawful purposes.  
 
• Alternative 1: Should the mandate cover injuries and deaths resulting from (1) 
unintentional shootings only or (2) intentional and unintentional shootings? 
 
In 2011, there were six times as many assaults as there were accidental shootings.  The 20 
unintentional firearm deaths accounted for only 1.1 percent of all manners and methods of 
violent death in North Carolina, whereas the 519 homicides accounted for nearly 29 percent.  
Thus, providing coverage for both intentional and unintentional shootings would maximize 
compensation for victims and would be most likely to reduce gun violence.  Although the costs 
to insurers and gun owners would be higher under this option, they are likely to be small in 
comparison to the value of lives saved and the value of compensating innocent people injured by 
the misuse of firearms. 
 
A mandate that covers injuries and deaths resulting from intentional injuries is not going 
to be popular among insurers and lawmakers.  Insurance companies have vocally opposed any 
scheme that would provide coverage for intentional acts.  Insurers fear that insuring intentional 
acts would give individuals an incentive to commit violent acts.  However, because it is unlikely 
that a shooter would use his own resources to compensate a victim, insuring intentional acts 
would not raise a moral hazard problem. 
 
• Alternative 2: Should the mandate apply to (1) concealed carry permit holders only or 
(2) to all gun owners in North Carolina? 
 
By the end of 2011, there were more than 240,000 concealed carry permit holders in 
North Carolina.  Although the precise number of gun owners in North Carolina is unknown, 
estimates indicate that, at a minimum, North Carolina has about 1.2 million gun owners.  
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Evidence also suggests that a significant number of gun-related assaults are committed by gun 
owners who do not possess a concealed carry permit.  Although a mandate that applies to all gun 
owners would provide coverage for a greater number of gun violence victims, the costs of 
providing coverage to all gun owners would be higher than providing coverage for concealed 
carry permit holders alone.  Since gun owners who do not possess a concealed carry permit 
commit a greater number of weapons-related assaults, insurers would likely have fewer claims to 
pay out if the mandate only applied to concealed carry permit holders. 
 
Concealed carry permit holders are already regulated by the state.  Thus, mandating 
liability insurance for concealed carry permit holders is far more feasible than mandating 
insurance for all gun owners. 
 
• Alternative 3: Should the mandate apply to (1) new firearms purchased after the mandate 
is enacted or (2) to all firearms? 
 
A significantly small portion of gun injuries and deaths would be covered if the mandate 
were to apply to firearms purchased after the insurance scheme were implemented.  The costs 
generated by insurers and gun owners would, however, be higher if the mandate applied to all 
firearms since insurance companies would be required to pay out significantly more claims.   
 
 If the mandate only applied to new purchases, fewer gun owners would be implicated.  
Thus, an insurance scheme that applies to guns purchased after the date of enactment is likely to 
be more feasible.  
 
Recommendation (p. 30) 
 
I recommend that the gun liability insurance scheme (1) cover injuries and deaths from 
intentional and unintentional shootings, (2) apply to concealed carry permit holders only, and (3) 
apply to all firearms, purchased before and after the date of enactment.   
 
Moving Forward (p. 31) 
 
Before any gun liability scheme can be implemented in North Carolina, several more 
issues need to be resolved.  For example, should the mandate provide compensation for pain and 
suffering, or merely medical expenses and funeral costs?  What factors should insurance 
providers take into account when setting premiums?  Should the mandate be modeled after 
victims compensation programs or the tort system?     
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 On December 14, 2012, Adam Lanza, a 20-year old resident of Newtown, Connecticut 
shot and killed twenty children and six staff members at Sandy Hook Elementary School.  It was 
the second-deadliest mass shooting by a single person in American history.  The shooting 
renewed the debate about gun control and prompted a series of measures to reduce gun violence.   
 
 Some states proposed banning assault weapons and high-capacity ammunition, while 
others recommended more stringent background checks for purchasing firearms.  Following the 
Newtown shooting, several states proposed a market-based approach to reducing gun deaths and 
compensating victims of gun violence—mandatory gun liability insurance.   
 
The toll gun violence takes on our communities is massive.  Firearms are responsible for 
over 30,000 deaths in the United States annually.  In 2011 alone, 1,133 North Carolinians died as 
a result of firearms.  The economic costs of gun violence are also vast.  The average 
hospitalization charge for the treatment of nonfatal and fatal firearm injuries runs upwards of 
$40,000.  The costs of treating these victims are borne by victims, victims’ families, and 
taxpayers, and not the gun owners responsible for causing the injury. 
 
Gun liability insurance would hold gun owners accountable for the social costs of gun 
ownership by making them liable for any damage their firearms cause.  Our tort system provides 
some financial remedy for victims of gun violence.  For example, someone injured from the 
accidental discharge of a firearm can pursue civil action against the negligent party.  
Alternatively, if a neighbor is injured by a firearm on an individual’s private property, that 
individual’s homeowners insurance policy would compensate the victim for any reasonable 
medical expenses and provide coverage for legal damages.  Additionally, states across the 
country also provide financial compensation for victims of gun-related assaults.  Although these 
programs and methods of compensation provide some financial relief to victims of gun violence 
and their families, they do not provide adequate monetary reparations.   
 
 For example the medical payments coverage of homeowners insurance policies do not 
apply to injuries sustained by the policyholder or anyone that resides in the household.  Over 40 
percent of North Carolinian households reported having a firearm.  Households with guns in the 
home are at an elevated risk of homicide, suicide, and unintentional shootings.  However, victims 
who belong to the same household as the policyholder would be precluded from obtaining 
financial compensation through the policyholder’s homeowners insurance policy. 
 
 Although homeowners insurance policies cover incidents that occur outside the 
homeowners property, only accidental shootings are covered.  Thus, any victim who is injured or 
fatally killed as a result of a gun-related assault would automatically be disqualified from 
receiving compensation through the perpetrator’s homeowners insurance policy.  Given that far 
more individuals are killed and injured as a result of intentional shootings rather than 
unintentional shootings, a large number of victims would be unable to obtain any compensation 
through homeowners insurance.  
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And while state victims compensation programs do offer financial assistance to victims 
of gun-related assaults and homicide victims, compensation is limited.  The North Carolina 
Victims Compensation Services Division awards, $3,500 on average, and to crime victims only.  
This award is insufficient, given that the average hospitalization charge in North Carolina for 
firearm-related injuries is more than $40,000.   
 
It is evident that a sizeable gap in financial compensation exists for victims of intentional 
shootings and victims who belong in the same household as policyholder.  (See Appendix A).  A 
gun liability insurance mandate would fill this gap in coverage and would shift the costs of gun 
ownership from the victims to gun owners. 
 
This paper addresses key policy considerations for implementing a gun liability insurance 
scheme in North Carolina.  First, should the mandate cover unintentional shootings or both 
unintentional and intentional shootings?  Second, should the mandate apply to all gun owners or 
concealed carry permit holders only?  Lastly, should the mandate apply to firearms purchased 
after the liability insurance requirement has been implemented or to all firearms in circulation?  
The following three criteria were useful in determining which policy options should to be 
implemented: (1) maximize compensation to victims and reduce gun violence, and minimize 
costs to insurers and gun owners; (2) maximize political feasibility; and (3) maintain 
constitutionality.    
 
The policy analysis I conducted indicates that a gun liability insurance mandate should 
cover unintentional and intention shootings, affect concealed carry permit holders only, and 
apply to all firearms in circulation.   
 
The report is organized into ten sections: (I) Policy Question, (II) Defining the Problem, 
(III) Liability for Incidents Involving Firearms, (IV) Compensation for Victims of Gun Violence, 
(V) Regulating Insurance in North Carolina, (VI) Alternatives, (VII) Criteria, (VIII) Analysis, 
(IX) Recommendation, and (X) Moving Forward.  In the first two sections, I introduce the policy 
issue and discuss the specific nature and scope of the problem.  The third section discusses the 
numerous situations in which a person could be held financially liable for misusing a firearm.  
The fourth section summarizes the various means through which a gun violence victim could 
obtain financial compensation for injuries sustained.  The fifth section briefly discusses how 
insurance is regulated in North Carolina.  The sixth and seventh sections discuss policy options 
and relevant criteria.  In the eighth and ninth sections, I conduct my policy analysis, by applying 
the criteria to each of the policy options, and offer a recommendation.  The tenth and final 
section poses additional considerations for implementing a gun liability insurance scheme.   
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I. POLICY QUESTION 
 
Would a gun liability insurance requirement reduce gun violence in North Carolina and 
ensure compensation for victims of gun violence?  Specifically, how would a liability insurance 
requirement reduce gun violence and provide compensation for shooting victims? 
 
II. DEFINING THE PROBLEM 
 
a. Gun Violence 
 
Violent death from firearms is a major public health issue in the United States.  The 
United States is unique among developed nations in its immense civilian gun ownership.  Indeed, 
the United States has the highest rate of civilian gun ownership compared to other developed 
nations.1  Indeed, between 35 and 39 percent of U.S. households have a firearm.2  Though the 
majority of the 262 million firearms3 available to the civilian population are used for legitimate 
reasons, such as hunting and target shooting,4 a sizeable portion of firearms are used against 
individuals in assaults, suicides, and accidents.   
 
Although many Americans are killed each year by guns, even more are non-fatally 
injured, with the exception of suicides.  In 2010, there were 19,392 fatal suicides and 4,643 non-
fatal suicide attempts involving firearms the United States.  (See Table 1).  That same year, 
11,078 Americans were victims of homicide by firearm; 53,738 individuals were assaulted with 
firearms and survived.  Over 600 Americans were unintentionally killed with firearms; 14,161 
individuals were accidentally shot and survived.    
 
Table 1: United States Firearm Fatality Profile, 2010  
(Suicides, Homicides, Accidental) 
Method of Death Deaths Nonfatal Injuries Total 
Case Fatality 
Rates 
Suicides 19,392 4,643 24,045 81% 
Homicides 11,078 53,738 64,816 17% 
Accidental 
Shooting 606 14,161 14,767 4% 
Source: National Center for Injury Prevention and Control: Data & Statistics, 2010 (WISQARS), CDC 
 
North Carolina has some of the highest rates of gun violence in the United States.  In fact, 
between 1999 and 2010, firearms were responsible for 13,272 deaths in North Carolina alone—
an annual rate of 12.69/100,000.5  During that time period, the national firearm death rate was 
10.3/100,000.  That rate is roughly 20 percent higher than the national average.  More than twice 
as many North Carolinians were killed with guns than killed in combat in the Iraq and 
Afghanistan wars.6   
 
In 2011, 1,819 people in North Carolina died as a result of violence.7  Firearms accounted 
for nearly 63 percent of all violent deaths in the state that year.8    
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i. Suicides in North Carolina 
 
The North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services defines suicide as “a 
death resulting from the intentional use of force against oneself.”9  In 2011, a total of 1,202 
violent deaths were caused by self-inflicted injuries.10  Firearms accounted for 60.5 percent of all 
suicides—a handgun was the most common firearm used.11   
 
The North Carolina Health and Human Services does not maintain data for nonfatal 
violent injuries. To calculate the total number of North Carolinians who attempted suicide, I 
divided the reported number of violent deaths caused by self-inflicted injuries with firearms with 
the percentage of suicides involving firearms that are fatal.  (See Table 2).  After determining the 
total number of suicide attempts, I subtracted from it the reported number of suicide fatalities.  
Using this calculation, I determined that in 2011, approximately 282 North Carolinians attempted 
suicide and survived.i 
 
ii. Assaults in North Carolina 
 
As of 2010, North Carolina had the 16th highest gun murder rate in the country, nearly 10 
percent higher than the national average.12  North Carolina experienced 519 homicides in 2011; 
nearly 72 percent of these homicides were committed using a firearm.13  The majority of 
homicide victims were killed in or around their house or apartment (60.7 percent). 14  
Additionally, over 18 percent of all homicides between 2004 and 2011 were committed between 
partners, parents, children, or other relatives.15   
 
To calculate the total number of nonfatal assaults involving firearms in North Carolina, I 
divided the reported number of homicides involving firearms with the percentage of firearm 
assaults that are fatal.  After determining the total number of firearm assault attempts, I 
subtracted from it the reported number of homicides involving firearms.  Using this calculation, I 
determined that in 2011, there were approximately 2,534 nonfatal assaults involving firearms in 
North Carolina.ii 
 
iii. Accidental Shootings in North Carolina 
 
Deaths from accidental shootings are far less common than homicides and suicides.  An 
unintentional firearm death is defined as “a death resulting from a penetrating injury or gunshot 
wound from a weapon that uses a powder charge to fire a projectile and for which a 
                                                
i Number of nonfatal suicides in North Carolina involving firearms = Number of suicide attempts in North Carolina 
involving firearms – Number of reported suicide deaths in North Carolina involving firearms = (Number of reported 
suicide deaths in North Carolina involving firearms ÷ National fatal suicide rate involving firearms) – Number of 
reported suicide deaths in North Carolina involving firearms = (1202 ÷ .81) – 1202 = 282.  Thus, in 2011 in North 
Carolina, about 282 individuals attempted suicide with a firearm and survived. 
ii Number of nonfatal assaults in North Carolina involving firearms = Number of assault attempts in North Carolina 
involving firearms – Number of reported homicides in North Carolina involving firearms = (Number of reported 
homicides in North Carolina involving firearms ÷ National fatal homicide rate involving firearms) – Number of 
reported homicides in North Carolina involving firearms = (519 ÷ .17) – 519 = 2,534.  Thus, in 2011 in North 
Carolina, about 2,534 individuals were assaulted with firearms and survived.   
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preponderance of evidence indicates that the shooting was not directed intentionally at the 
decedent.”16  In 2011, 20 North Carolinians died from a firearm injury sustained in a shooting 
not intentionally directed at the victim, accounting for 1.1 percent of all violent deaths.17   
 
Unintentional firearm death can occur during hunting and target shooting, while cleaning 
a gun, playing with a gun, loading/unloading a gun, unintentionally pulling the trigger, and a 
ricocheting bullet.   Indeed, the most common circumstances surrounding unintentional firearm 
injuries resulting in death was the shooter unintentionally pulling the trigger (13 cases).18  In 7 of 
unintentional firearm death cases, the shooting occurred while the victim was playing with the 
gun.19  Other circumstances where injury occurred included:  the shooter was loading or 
unloading the gun (1 case); the gun discharged when it was dropped (2 cases); the shooter 
thought the gun was unloaded or for some other unspecified reason (1 case); the gun had a defect 
or it malfunctioned (5.0%); the injury occurred while cleaning the gun (1 case); the injury 
occurred while hunting (7 cases); and the gun was mistaken for a toy (1 case).20 
 
Additionally, among the unintentional firearm deaths reported nationally, 47 percent were 
inflicted by family members and 43 percent by friends.21  According to the CDC, “unintentional 
firearm deaths disproportionately affect children, with 16% of unintentional deaths occurring 
among youth under age 20.”22  These injuries are often caused when children play with firearms 
in the home with easy access to firearms and with little to no adult supervision.23  Among the 20 
unintentional firearm deaths in North Carolina in 2011, 10 involved individuals under the age of 
20.24   
 
To calculate the total number of nonfatal accidental shooting victims in North Carolina, I 
divided the reported number of accidental shooting fatalities with the percentage of accidental 
shootings that were fatal.  After determining the total number of accidental shootings, I 
subtracted from it the reported number of accidental shooting fatalities.  Using this calculation, I 
determined that in 2011, there were approximately 480 nonfatal accidental shootings involving 
firearms in North Carolina.iii 
 
Source: North Carolina Violent Data Reporting System, Annual Report 2011, North Carolina Injury & Violence Prevention Branch, Division of 
Public Health; National Center for Injury Prevention and Control: Data & Statistics, 2010 (WISQARS), CDC 
 
 
 
                                                
iii Number of nonfatal accidental shootings in North Carolina = Number of accidental shootings in North Carolina – 
Number of fatal accidental shootings in North Carolina = (Number of reported accidental shooting fatalities in North 
Carolina ÷ National accidental shooting fatality rate) – Number of reported accidental shootings fatalities = (20 ÷ 
.04) – 20 = 480.  Thus, in 2011 in North Carolina, 480 individuals were accidentally shot and survived. 
 
Table 2: North Carolina Firearm Fatality Profile, 2011 Estimates 
Method of Death Fatal Nonfatal Injuries (Estimates) 
Total 
Suicide 1,202 282 1,484 
Assault 519 2,534 3,053 
Accidental Shooting 20 480 500 
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b. Presence of Firearms in the Home  
 
In a 2004 North Carolina Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance Survey, 40.9 percent of 
respondents reported having a firearm.25   One study indicated that people who lived in 
households with firearms were between two and three times more likely to be killed from suicide 
and murder compared to those who lived in homes without guns.26  
 
Many children and adolescents are able to access household firearms because of unsafe 
gun storage.  Researchers have found a significant association between the percentage of gunshot 
wounds occurring in the home and the percentage of American households containing any 
firearms, loaded firearms, and unlocked loaded firearms.27   Over 56,000 children, ages 18 and 
under, were hospitalized for the treatment of injuries sustained from firearms between 2001 and 
2012.28 
 
Studies have also shown that “the majority of firearms used in youth suicides and 
unintentional deaths were acquired from either the youth’s home or the home of a friend or 
relative.”29  Estimates suggest that as many as 85 percent of the firearms used in youth firearm 
suicides were obtained from the home of the victim, a relative, or a friend.30  
 
And while nearly every North Carolina household reports having at least one smoke 
detector, only 57 percent lock away firearms in a place where children cannot access them.31   
Even more disturbing is that among homes with firearms and children under the age of 18, 43 
percent of parents reported having at least one gun unlocked, loaded, or both.32   
 
c. Economic Costs of Gun Violence 
 
While the human toll from gun violence is vast, the cost of treating injuries from firearms 
poses an economic burden on society. A 2010 study calculated the economic cost of gun 
violence to be $174 billion33, which roughly amounts to an annual firearm injury cost averaging 
$645 per gun.34  This figure includes medical and mental health care costs, lost wages, criminal 
justice costs, and the value of pain, suffering, and lost quality of life.35  
 
In 2012, nearly 81,400 individuals were treated in emergency departments for non-fatal 
gun shot wounds.36  Between 2004 and 2007, North Carolina emergency departments reported 
over 4,000 hospitalizations for the treatment of firearm injures.37  The fatal and nonfatal injuries 
resulted in 28,421 days of hospitalization, resulting in a total hospitalization charge of nearly 
$162 million.38  This grand sum only included medical and hospital costs—it did not include 
costs related to disability, pain and suffering, lost quality of life, lost wages, or subsequent 
related medical care.39  
 
American taxpayers shouldered about 49 percent of the cost of treating gun violence 
victims in 1994.40  In 2010, the average cost of hospital treatment for a gun violence victim was 
approximately $14,000 more than that of an average hospital visit.41  A trip to the emergency 
room for a shooting victim can be costly—the care and treatment of a gun violence victim 
generally involves a team of medical personnel, including a “trauma surgeon, emergency room 
attendant, at least two nurses, three or more medical residents, a radiologist, a radiologist 
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technician, a respiratory therapist, an anesthesiologist, three EMS workers, a blood-bank worker, 
two techs or certified nursing assistants and a social works.”42   
 
Although health care costs vary case by case, some charges, like surgery, use of the 
emergency room, overnight stays in the hospital, and costs associated with laboratory work and 
pharmacy, are fairly common.  
 
III. LIABILITY FOR INCIDENTS INVOLVING FIREARMS  
 
An individual who is injured as a result of the intentional or negligent mishandling of a 
firearm has several potential remedies, the most common of which is a tort action against the 
individual who misused the firearm.   
 
a. Intentional Tort 
 
An assailant may be held liable for intentionally causing injury to another under North 
Carolina’s tort law.  Typically, “if a person is violating the law by shooting a weapon, he is 
civilly liable for an injury, even an accidental injury, inflicted by him with such weapon.”43  A 
defendant’s motive in discharging a firearm is irrelevant where his act is illegal.  Tort law 
recognizes a broad rule of liability in cases involving physical injury or harm.  Accordingly, in 
tort law “the line between intent and negligence is much less significant than is the same line 
within the criminal law.” 
  
North Carolina recognizes the intentional tort of assault and battery.  An assault is an 
“offer to show violence to another without striking him,” whereas a battery is the “carrying of 
the threat into effect by the infliction of a blow.” 44  For an actor to be liable for assault, he must 
merely put the other in apprehension of imminent contact—actual physical contact is not 
necessary.45  In Johnson v. Bollinger, the defendant approached the plaintiff in a hostile and 
threatening manner, while carrying a firearm.46  The defendant shook his hand in the plaintiff’s 
face and proclaimed in a loud voice, “You are a stupid son-of-a-bitch,” “You are a liar,” and 
stated further “I will get you.”47  Under those circumstances, the Court of Appeals of North 
Carolina found that the plaintiff could reasonably expect imminent offensive contact and 
subsequently denied defendant’s motion to dismiss the action.48 
 
Unlike an assault, which is a threat of violence, a battery is carrying the threat into effect 
by striking another.  Thus, a battery occurs when the plaintiff victim is “offensively touched” 
against the plaintiff’s will.  The hostile intent of the defendant assailant is irrelevant; rather, the 
issue in an action of battery is the absence of consent to contact on the part of the victim.49  
Unlike a claim of negligence, the intentional tort of battery is not premised on the existence of a 
duty between parties.50  A plaintiff victim is permitted to recover damages for assault and battery 
for mental anguish and the physical injury.51  In Vernon v. Barrow, after plaintiff customer 
refused to leave defendant’s lounge, defendant pulled out a firearm and fired several shots into 
the floor of the lounge near the plaintiff’s feet.52  One of the bullets ricocheted and struck 
plaintiff in the left thigh.53  The Court of Appeals held that defendant’s conduct in firing the gun 
gave rise to actions for assault and battery.54   
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The Supreme Court of North Carolina recognizes that “if one is injured from the 
discharge of firearms negligently used or handled by another, the person causing the injury is 
civilly liable even though the discharge was not intended.”55  An individual handling or carrying 
a loaded firearm in the vicinity of others is liable for its discharge, even if the discharge is 
accidental and unintentional.  Because firearms are typically not discharged without the 
intervention of another, courts presume that when firearms are discharged while in the 
possession and control of another, “the firing is caused either by design, carelessness, or 
inadvertence upon his part.”56  
 
b. Negligence  
 
Although the Supreme Court has held that an intentional act may not be the basis for a 
claim in negligence57, in certain situations, the evidence presented may raise questions of both 
assault and battery, and negligence.   
In order for a claim of negligence to succeed, the injured party must allege (1) a legal 
duty, (2) a breach of that duty, (3) actual and proximate causation, and (4) injury.  “Actionable 
negligence is the failure to exercise that degree of care which a reasonable and prudent person 
would exercise under similar conditions. A defendant is liable for his negligence if the 
negligence is the proximate cause of injury to a person to whom the defendant is under a duty to 
use reasonable care.”58  The Supreme Court recognizes that “utmost caution must be used in 
[the] care and custody [of firearms], to the end that harm may not come to others from coming in 
contact with them.”59 
In Lynn v. Burnette, plaintiff was shot in the neck when defendant’s firearm discharged 
while aimed at plaintiff’s car tire.60  Although both parties agreed the actions constituted an 
intentional tort, they disagreed as to whether it gave rise to a negligence claim.  Unlike a claim 
for negligence, which must be brought within three years of the date of the action, a claim for 
assault and battery must be pursued within one year.  Ultimately the court found that the 
defendant’s conduct gave rise to civil actions for assault and battery, and negligence.  Because 
the defendant intended to shoot the vehicle’s tire and not the plaintiff, the plaintiff was permitted 
to pursue a negligence action, and was thereby not barred from seeking damages under the 
statute of limitations.       
North Carolina is among the few jurisdictions which still adheres to the strict doctrine of 
contributory negligence.  Under this doctrine, if a plaintiff sues another under a theory of 
negligence, the plaintiff may not recover any damages if his injuries were caused by his own 
negligence.  Contributory negligence acts as a complete bar to a claimant’s recovery.61  In order 
for contributory negligence to bar recovery, there must be a finding that the plaintiff acted or 
failed to act with knowledge and appreciation of the danger of injury which his actions 
involved.62  Typically, “when a person deliberately exposes himself to danger of which he is, or 
in the exercise of reasonable care should be, aware, he is contributorily negligent as a matter of 
law.”63  In Edwards v. Johnson, the dissent described several hunting cases where contributory 
negligence was found.64  For example, if a hunter goes deer hunting wearing only camouflage 
and no hunter orange, he may be found guilty of contributory negligence if a fellow hunter 
shoots him, mistaking him for a deer.    
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i. Common Law Negligence  
 
Under common law negligence, “the law imposes upon every person who enters upon an 
active course of conduct the positive duty to exercise ordinary care to protect others from 
harm.”65  A violation of that duty of ordinary care, which is a duty to act reasonably, constitutes 
negligence.  In Edwards v. Johnson, the plaintiff sued for personal injuries sustained when the 
defendant accidentally discharged a shotgun.66  The defendant, expecting the plaintiff to stop by 
her home, went to answer the door after plaintiff knocked on the door.67  As the defendant 
reached to push the curtains back from the door, with a 16-gauge shotgun in hand, the firearm hit 
the door and discharged, hitting the plaintiff in the right leg, causing permanent injury.68   The 
court found that the defendant had a duty to exercise the utmost care to prevent the unintentional 
discharge of her firearm.  Based on those circumstances, the Supreme Court held that there was 
sufficient evidence for a jury to decide whether defendant acted negligently.69   
 
Similarly, in Mitchum v. Gaskill, plaintiff filed a civil suit against the defendant when, 
during an argument, defendant’s shotgun discharged, wounding plaintiff in his right side.  The 
defendant pled guilty to assault inflicting serious bodily injury.  In the civil trial, the jury found 
that the defendant negligently injured the plaintiff by unintentionally shooting him with the 
shotgun, and was awarded $772,700.   
 
ii. Negligent Supervision of a Minor 
 
 A parent may not necessarily be liable for the wrongful acts of their unemancipated 
minor children by virtue of the parent-child relationship.70  However, while the parent-child 
relationship does not automatically make a parent liable for the wrongful acts of the minor child, 
“a parent who knows or should know of dangerous propensities of his child may be held liable 
for failing to exercise reasonable control over the child so as to prevent injury to others caused 
by these dangerous propensities.” 71   Additionally, “a parent may be held liable for the 
independently negligent act of failing to exercise reasonable control without regard to whether 
the unemancipated child’s tort is intentional or the result of negligence.”72  Thus, “the parent of 
an unemancipated child may be held liable in damages for failing to exercise reasonable control 
over the child's behavior if the parent had the ability and the opportunity to control the child and 
knew or should have known of the necessity for exercising such control.”73  However, “before it 
may be found that a parent knew or should have known of the necessity for exercising control 
over the child, it must be shown that the parent knew or in the exercise of due care should have 
known of the propensities of the child and could have reasonably foreseen that failure to control 
those propensities would result in injurious consequences.”74  For liability to attach for negligent 
supervision, merely the consequences of a generally injurious nature, and not the particular 
injury, must have been foreseeable.75   
 
 In Patterson v. Weatherspoon, the minor plaintiff was significantly injured when he was 
struck in the eye by a golf putter operated by the defendant’s 6-year-old son.76  The Court of 
Appeals held that, under the circumstances, there was no evidence to permit a jury to find “that 
[the] defendant should, by the exercise of due care, have reasonably foreseen that his child was 
likely to use the golf putter in such a manner as to cause injury and that he, thereafter, failed to 
exercise reasonable care to restrict or supervise the child’s use thereof.”77  The Court cited Lane 
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v. Chatham, in which the defendant parents’ 9-year-old son shot plaintiff in the eye, causing total 
loss thereof.  The Chatham court held that the air rifle used was not a dangerous instrumentality, 
per se.78  And, because, the father had no knowledge of the child’s prior misuse of the air rifle, 
the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of the father’s liability for the minor child’s 
wrongful act.  Accordingly, the Weatherspoon court concluded that a golf putter was not a 
dangerous instrumentality and held that “evidence was insufficient to show that the father had 
failed to exercise reasonable care to restrict son’s use of golf putter with which playmate was 
injured.”79  The court noted that unlike Chatham, defendant father in Weatherspoon had no 
reason to believe that his son would use the putter in the presence of others.80  Unlike air rifles 
and golf putters, however, firearms are undeniably dangerous instrumentalities.81  If evidence 
suggests that a parent was aware that a child would misuse a firearm and gave the child explicit 
or implicit permission to use the firearm, which subsequently was used to cause injury, a court 
would likely find that parent liable. 
 
iii. Negligent Entrustment 
 
The theory of negligent entrustment typically applies to situations involving motor 
vehicles, where the cause of action arises when the owner of a vehicle “entrusts its operation to a 
person whom he knows, or by the exercise of due care should have known, to be an incompetent 
or reckless driver” who is likely to cause harm to others in its use.82  Indeed, almost all negligent 
entrustment cases in North Carolina involve motor vehicles.  However, negligent entrustment 
cases can involve instrumentalities other than automobiles. 
 
Entrustment merely requires explicit or implicit consent from the defendant for the third 
party to use the instrumentality in question.  North Carolina courts have yet to decide whether a 
defendant’s mere consent to possession of an instrumentality, alone, gives rise to the level of 
entrustment.  However, in Hill v. West, the Court of Appeals concluded that where a defendant 
did not give permission to use the instrumentality in question, he could not be held liable, if the 
instrumentality was operated without the defendant’s knowledge or consent.83   
 
In the context of firearms, if there is no evidence that the defendant, expressly or 
impliedly, entrusted the firearm’s operation to the third party assailant, or gave permission to use 
the firearm, it is a court will likely find that the alleged actions will not rise to the level of 
entrustment.  Additionally, if the defendant cannot reasonably foresee that the entrustment will 
cause harm or injury, then the defendant owes no duty to protect third parties under a theory of 
negligent entrustment. 
   
iv. Child Abuse and Endangerment 
 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-318.2(a) states, “Any parent of a child less than 16 years of age, or 
any other person providing care to or supervision of such child . . . who creates or allows to be 
created a substantial risk of physical injury, upon or to such child by other than accidental means 
is guilty of the Class A1 misdemeanor of child abuse.”84  Although § 14-318.2 is a criminal 
statute, the Court of Appeals has held that a parent’s (or an individual supervising a child) failure 
to perform “a duty to take every step reasonably possible under the circumstances . . . to prevent 
harm to their children” is negligence.85  Although North Carolina courts have yet to hear a civil 
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case based on this statute, it is possible that a court would find a parent, who creates a substantial 
risk of physical injury by keeping firearms accessible to children, liable for any injuries that may 
result.      
 
v. Exception – Negligent Storage of Firearms and Criminal Acts of a Third 
Party 
 
Although the North Carolina General Assembly has enacted several statutes relating to 
the proper storage and use of firearms, it has elected not to impose civil liability for the negligent 
storage of firearms against parties who do not owe a legal duty. 
 
In Bridges v. Parrish, a shooting victim brought a negligence action against the 
assailant’s parents, who owned the firearm used in the shooting.86  The plaintiff alleged that the 
defendant parents negligently stored their firearm, which the assailant took from their home and 
used to shoot and injure the plaintiff.  Following the assault, plaintiff filed a civil complaint 
alleging that the defendants “knew or should have known that [the assailant] posed a risk of 
serious harm to Plaintiff” and “failed to take reasonable and/or necessary steps to keep [their] 
guns in a safe and secure place, or otherwise adequately locked and located such that [the 
assailant] could not get access to and possession of any such guns.”87  The Supreme Court held 
that the parents were not liable for the criminal actions of a third party—their 52-year-old son—
because the parents owed no legal duty to the plaintiff.88  When the injury to the plaintiff is not 
foreseeable and avoidable through due care, no legal duty exists.   
 
Generally, there is no legal duty to protect others from harm that is “only remotely and 
slightly probable.”89  Because criminal acts of a third party are generally “unforeseeable and 
independent,”90 defendants are absolved of liability.  For example, in Winters v. Lee, defendant 
grandmother loaned her car to her grandson, who used the vehicle to drive to plaintiff’s house 
and stab her 37 times.91  Although the defendant knew her grandson was intoxicated, emotionally 
disturbed, and had harmed the plaintiff in the past, the stabbing was an unforeseeable result of 
the defendant’s conduct.92  Because the injury was unforeseeable, the defendant had no duty to 
act upon.  
 
An exception to this rule enables a defendant to be held civilly liable for the criminal acts 
of a third party—a special relationships exists “when the defendant’s relationship with the 
plaintiff or the third person justifies making the defendant answerable civilly for the harm to the 
plaintiff.”93  No special relationship exists between the defendant and the third person unless, 
“(1) the defendant knows or should know of the third person’s violent propensities and (2) the 
defendant has the ability and opportunity to control the third party at the time of the third 
person’s criminal acts.”94   Neither the spousal relationship, nor the parent-child relationship 
gives rise to a duty to protect third parties from actions of a third party. 
 
c. Negligence Per Se 
 
A violation of a public safety statute may constitute negligence per se.  In North Carolina, 
“when a statute imposes a duty on a person for the protection of others [the Supreme Court] [has] 
held that it is a public safety statute and a violation of such a statute is negligence per se unless 
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the statute says otherwise.”95  For example, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 42-44(d) on residential rental 
agreements specifically asserts that, “a violation of this Article shall not constitute negligence per 
se.”96  Alternatively, statutes pertaining to firearms make no mention that violation of the statute 
is negligence per se.   
 
A public safety statute is one that imposes upon the defendant a “specific duty for the 
protection of others.”97  However, even when a defendant has been found to violate a public 
safety statute, the plaintiff may not receive any damages unless the plaintiff belongs to “the class 
[of persons] intended to be protected by [the] statute,” and the statutory violation is “a proximate 
cause of [the plaintiff’s] injury.”98  
  
In Taylor v. Stewart, a father habitually permitted his son to operate his automobile since 
the child was 10-years-old.99  The father had also allowed his son to drive others in the 
vehicle.100  The plaintiff sued to recover for the death of his child, who was run over and killed 
by the vehicle belonging to the defendant.101  The driver of the automobile was the defendant’s 
13-year-old son.102  The Supreme Court held that where a parent permits his minor child to 
operate a vehicle in violation of a statute regulating operation of motor vehicle, the parent is 
negligent and is, therefore, responsible for those injuries which are the result of such 
violations.103  Although Stewart was decided nearly a century ago, it has not been overturned and 
remains valid law. 
 
One could plausibly argue that all statutes pertaining to firearms are public safety 
statutes.  The transfer, ownership, and use of firearms in North Carolina is extensively regulated 
by the state.  For example, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-315.1 was enacted to prevent minors from 
obtaining firearms.  Arguably, the statute is designed to protect the public from minors who are 
unaware of the potential dangers of weapons such as firearms.  Under the statute, “Any person 
who resides in the same premises as a minor, owns or possesses a firearm, and stores or leaves 
the firearm (i) in a condition that the firearm can be discharged and (ii) in a manner that the 
person knew or should have known that an unsupervised minor would be able to gain access to 
the firearm is guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor” if a minor “[c]auses personal injury or death with 
it not in self defense” or “[u]ses it in the commission of a crime.”104  Moreover, it is important to 
note that a homeowner does not have criminal responsibility for failing to secure any firearms if 
the minor's parents or guardian granted the minor lawful permission to obtain the firearm or the 
firearm was procured by the unlawful entry into the owner's residence.105  To prevail on a claim 
of negligence per se, a plaintiff must demonstrate, “(1) a duty created by a statute or ordinance; 
(2) that the statute or ordinance was enacted to protect a class of persons which includes the 
plaintiff; (3) the breach of statutory duty; (4) that the injury sustained was suffered by interest 
which the statute protected; (5) that the injury was of nature contemplated in statute; and (6) that 
the violation of the statute proximately caused the injury.”106  Additionally, “when a statute 
imposes a duty on a person for the protection of others, it is a public safety statute and a violation 
of such a statute is negligence per se.”107  Thus, a plaintiff would likely prevail on a claim of 
negligence per se for the violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-315.1 because the statute places a duty 
upon dwellers to keep homes safe and free from danger for the protection of minors.  
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IV. COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF GUN VIOLENCE 
 
Medical treatment for victims of gun violence is costly, and is a financial burden not just 
to victims, but to taxpayers as well.  Given that gun violence disproportionately affects urban and 
poor communities, many victims lack the financial resources to pay their medical bills.  For this 
reason, states have established crime compensation programs to help offset some of the costs.  In 
1987, the North Carolina Victims Compensation Services was established to “reimburse citizens 
who suffer medical expenses and lost wages as a result of being an innocent victim of a crime 
committed in North Carolina.”108  Victims of assault and families of homicide victims are 
eligible to apply for financial aid.109  Victims of accidental shootings are ineligible to receive 
compensation.  The state offers compensation for financial losses not covered by other sources, 
such as health insurance, auto or disability insurance, public funds, workers compensation, or 
restitution paid by the offender.110  The program also does not compensate victims for damaged 
property or pain and suffering.  Further, compensation is capped at $30,000 for medical expenses 
and $5,000 for funeral expenses.111  Many shooting victims’ medical expenses exceed $30,000, 
and thus cannot afford to pay the entirety of their treatment and hospitalization costs.   
 
From July 1, 2011 till February 27, 2012, the Victim Compensation Services Division 
awarded 1,676 claims totaling $5,327,627.112  From the crime victims fund payments, medical 
and dental expenses accounted for over 75 percent and burial expenses for 18 percent.113  The 
program has been largely successful as nearly 68 percent of the 4,549 claims filed between July 
1, 2008 and February 28, 2010 were issued awards.114  The average amount of each award was 
$3,550.115   
 
Although NCVCS provides some financial relief, the amount awarded to each successful 
claimant is minimal as it barely covers the average cost of an inpatient visit for a firearm assault 
injury. 
 
a. Homeowners Insurance 
 
In many instances, the primary compensation for a shooting victim is through the 
assailant’s homeowner’s insurance policy.116  Homeowners insurance is designed to cover events 
that cause damage to property and to protect the homeowners against liability for accidents that 
injure other people or damage their property.117  Specifically, homeowners insurance provides 
personal liability coverage in the event a policyholder or a member of the policyholder’s 
household is legally responsible for injuring another and covers medical expenses for individuals 
accidentally injured on the homeowner’s property.118  For example, if a neighbor’s child is 
injured while playing with a firearm in the home, the homeowners’ insurance may pay for the 
necessary medical expenses.    Some homeowners policies include “firearms clauses” that 
specifically provide liability coverage for death or bodily injury or damage to property caused by 
the accidental discharge of firearms.119 
 
However, many restrictions apply to this type of coverage.  Homeowner’s insurance does 
not apply to injuries sustained by the homeowner or those that reside in the household.120  Thus, 
if the policyholder’s child is injured by the accidental discharge of a firearm, homeowner’s 
insurance would not cover necessary medical expenses.  Additionally and not surprisingly, 
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homeowner’s insurance policies exclude coverage of intentional acts. 121   Therefore, if a 
policyholder intentionally shoots and injures a guest, damages and medical payments will not be 
covered by the insurance company.122  In North Carolina, a homeowner insurance policy will 
typically cover the accidental discharge of a firearm causing injury, but will not cover the 
intentional shooting of a guest.123 
 
The Court of Appeals of North Carolina has addressed insurance coverage of intentional 
acts on several occasions.  In North Carolina Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company v. Allen, 
the court found that intentionally firing a handgun at the defendant, in close proximity, “was 
sufficiently certain to cause injury that [the policy holder] should have expected such injury to 
occur.”124  The insurance policy specifically excluded coverage for injury or property damage 
“which [was] intended by or which may reasonably be expected to result from intentional acts . . 
.”125  Accordingly, Farm Bureau Insurance was not required to compensate the injured party.126   
 
Generally, for the exclusion to apply, the intentional act and the resulting injury must be 
intentional.  Thus, an unintended injury resulting from an intentional act is a covered 
“occurrence” or “accident” under homeowners insurance policies.127  In North Carolina Farm 
Bureau Mutual Insurance Company v. Stox, the court concluded that “where the term “accident” 
is not specifically defined in an insurance policy, that term does include injury resulting from an 
intentional act, if the injury is not intentional or substantially certain to be the result of the 
intentional act.”128  In Stox, the injured party, Louise Stox, was pushed by Gordon Owens, who 
was covered by a policy of homeowners liability insurance issued by Farm Bureau.  As a result 
of the fall, Stox suffered from a severely fractured arm.  The policy provided coverage for 
“bodily injury . . . caused by an occurrence.”129  While “occurrence” was defined as “an accident, 
including exposure to conditions, which results, during the policy period, in ... bodily injury,” the 
term “accident” was not defined anywhere in the policy.130  The court found that, while Owens’ 
intentionally pushed Stox, the resulting injuries were unintended, and therefore were covered 
under the policy as an “occurrence” or “accident.” 131   The likely conclusion is that a 
policyholder’s homeowners insurance policy will cover unintended injuries resulting from the 
intentional firing of a gun.  Indeed, in Miller v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, the 
Court of Appeals addressed this very issue.  In Miller, the policyholder—Madison Powell—fired 
a gun at a stop sign near the plaintiffs’ home.132  Although the bullet missed the stop sign, it went 
through the plaintiff children’s upstairs bedroom, breaking an overhead light fixture and causing 
plaintiff to suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder.133  The court in Miller cited Stox, 
concluding that because Powell did not intend to shoot at the plaintiffs’ home or cause damage to 
the home or injury to the plaintiffs, the incident constituted an accident covered by Powell’s 
homeowner’s policy.134  
 
Additionally, in North Carolina, homeowners personal liability insurance typically covers 
injuries whether they occur at or away from the home.  Thus, if a homeowner accidentally shoots 
a firearm, away from the home, thereby causing injury to another or damage to real or personal 
property, the incident would be covered by the homeowner’s policy.  In Miller v. Mutual 
Insurance Company, the policyholder, aiming at a stop sign, fired a shot into plaintiff’s 
daughter’s room.135  The Court of Appeals viewed the incident as an “accident” and was thereby 
covered under the insured’s homeowner’s liability insurance policy.136   Similarly, in State 
Capital Insurance v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, the question before the North 
 15 
Carolina Supreme Court was whether liability for injuries sustained by a third party, when a rifle 
that accidently discharged while being removed from a motor vehicle by the policy holder, was 
covered by the insured’s homeowners liability insurance policy.137  As in Miller, the court held 
that coverage was provided by the policyholder’s homeowners liability insurance policy.138    
 
b. Automobile Insurance  
 
Automobile insurance may also provide coverage for injuries resulting from the misuse 
of firearms.  For automobile liability insurance to provide coverage for injuries resulting from 
shootings, (1) “the vehicle must have been regularly used to transport the firearm” and (2) “the 
discharge of the firearm must have been the result of negligent, unintentional conduct.”139 
In State Capital Insurance Company v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, the 
policyholder, Howard Anderson, accidentally injured Milton McKinnon when Anderson’s rifle 
misfired as Anderson attempted to take it out of his vehicle.140  A typical automobile liability 
policy insures the policyholder against loss from the liability imposed by law “for damages 
arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of such motor vehicle.”141  “The test for 
determining whether a liability policy provides coverage for an accident is not whether the 
automobile was a proximate cause of the accident.  Instead, the test is whether there is a causal 
connection between the use of the automobile and the accident.”142  In State Capital, the court 
concluded that a causal connection did exist between the use of the automobile, the truck, and 
injuries to McKinnon.143  Because cars are often used to transport firearms and to unload and 
load items, the injury causing the incident was a consequence of the use of the vehicle.   
 
Alternatively, in Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company v. Knight, the Court of Appeals 
also ruled that an injury caused by shots fired from the policyholder’s moving vehicle did not 
constitute an accident arising out the ownership, maintenance, or use of the vehicle.144  In 
Knight, a three-year-old child was severely injured when he was shot at by the driver of another 
vehicle.145  Because there was no causal relationship between the ownership, maintenance and 
use of the policyholder’s moving vehicle, and the injury sustained by the child as a result of 
gunshots fired from that moving automobile, the insurer was not required to indemnify the 
policyholder.146    
 
In situations where the automobile itself was used as a dangerous instrumentality, courts 
typically find the insurer liable.  When a policy holder is “intentionally injured or killed by 
another, and the mishap is, as to him, unforeseen and not the result of his own misconduct, the 
general rule is that the injury or death is accidentally sustained within the meaning of the 
ordinary accident insurance policy, and the insurer is liable therefore [sic] in the absence of a 
policy provision excluding such liability.”147  Despite this explicit rule, courts have differed in its 
application. Whether an assault is an “accident” within the purview of automobile liability 
insurance policies depends upon “whether the court looked at the occurrence from the viewpoint 
of the aggressor or from that of the injured party.”148  The Supreme Court has acknowledged that 
the primary purpose of mandatory automobile liability insurance is to compensate victims who 
have been injured by careless motorists.149  Accordingly, the court has noted that the victim’s 
recovery should not depend upon “whether the conduct of its insured was intentional or 
negligent.”150  In Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company v. Roberts, the Supreme Court stated 
that to accomplish the goal of the law, “the perspective . . . must be that of the victim and not that 
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of the aggressor.”151  The court concluded that injuries intentionally inflicted by the use of a 
motor vehicle are covered under automobile liability insurance policies.152  
c. NRA Insurance 
 
All National Rifle Association (NRA) members are eligible to receive $2,500 ArmsCare 
Firearm Insurance at no cost.153  Under this insurance plan, guns and accessories are protected 
from direct physical loss, damage, fire, and theft.154  Members, whose firearms and accessories 
exceed the $2,500 coverage limit, can purchase additional firearms insurance; rates for this plan 
start at $65 per year.155  Members can also purchase additional liability protection for an 
additional cost.  NRA’s Personal Firearms Liability Insurance protects members against liability 
suits up to $1 million for any injuries and property damage that member unintentionally 
causes.156  However, coverage is limited to incidents that occur while hunting, trapping, at 
shooting competitions, or at private shooting ranges.157  The premiums for NRA-endorsed 
liability insurance are fairly reasonable—premiums range from a $47 annual fee for suits up to 
$100,000 to a $200 annual fee for suits up to $1 million.158   
 
Neither homeowners insurance, automobile insurance, nor NRA-endorsed insurance 
provide coverage for personal injury and property damage caused by intentional acts.  For 
families of victims who were intentionally gunned down, limited recourse is available for 
financial compensation.  A state sponsored mandatory liability insurance scheme could 
potentially fill this gap in coverage.  Such a scheme would enable victims of gun violence who 
were intentionally injured to receive compensation for medical expenses, lost wages, and pain 
and suffering.   
 
V. REGULATING INSURANCE IN NORTH CAROLINA 
 
The regulation of insurance is a function of the state rather than the federal government.  
The North Carolina Department of Insurance (DOI) is responsible for the licensing and 
supervision of insurance companies, and is charged by the General Assembly with the execution 
of laws relating to insurance.159  The chief officer of the DOI, the Commissioner of Insurance 
(Commissioner), is responsible for ensuring that the insurance laws are faithfully executed.160  
To that end, the Commissioner is also authorized to adopt rules to enforce insurance laws.161   
 
Before a domestic insurance company can issue policies, the Commissioner must have 
found the insurer to have complied with North Carolina laws and issued a certificate authorizing 
the insurer to issue policies.162  Only certain kinds of insurance may be offered in North 
Carolina; those that may be authorized in the state, include, among others, personal injury 
liability insurance, motor vehicle liability insurance, and miscellaneous insurance, defined as 
“insurance against any other casualty authorized by the charter of the company . . . which is a 
proper subject of insurance.”163   
 
a. Regulating Automobile Insurance in North Carolina 
North Carolina law requires proof of financial responsibility as a prerequisite to owning 
and operating a motor vehicle in the state.  The Financial Responsibility Act is written into every 
motor vehicle policy and it requires all automobiles in the state to be covered by an automobile 
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liability insurance policy.164  It was designed to compensate innocent motorists for property 
losses and personal injuries.  Policyholders may also opt for coverage for physical damage to the 
motor vehicle, medical payments for injuries sustained while occupying the covered automobile, 
and uninsured and underinsured motorists.165 
Motor vehicle insurance rates are determined by several parties.  The North Carolina Rate 
Bureau, a state agency independent of DOI, begins the rate-setting process by proposing rates for 
automobile, personal property and workers compensation.166  The Rate Bureau establishes a rate 
plan that all insurance companies must use as the basis for their rates.  The Rate Bureau and the 
Commissioner often use the services of out-of-state statistical organizations that collect and 
furnish loss or expense statistics in an advisory capacity.  Four other parties play major roles in 
setting North Carolina’s automobile rates: the Commissioner, the court system, the Reinsurance 
Facility, and private insurers.  Once the Rate Bureau develops a rate plan, taking into account 
driving history, type and use of automobile, and geographic location, the insurance 
Commissioner reviews it.  The Commissioner is charged with determining whether the premium 
rates charged are “excessive, inadequate, unfairly discriminatory or are otherwise not in the 
public interest.”167  If the Commissioner requests changes to the rate plan, as is most often the 
case, he or she then holds public hearings, unless the Commissioner settles with the members of 
the Rate Bureau before the hearings take place.168  If, after the hearings, the Rate Bureau does 
not like the decision of the Commissioner, it can appeal the decision to the North Carolina Court 
of Appeals.169  Settlements between the Commissioner and the Rate Bureau, conducted without 
public involvement, largely create the rate plan ultimately approved.170  However, even these 
settlements do not result in the final rates.  The rates that policyholders actually pay come from 
“rate deviations” that insurance providers file.171  While insurers can charge less than the 
recommended rates by the Bureau, the Commissioner has yet to approve of upward deviations 
that would result in a higher rate than that assigned by the Bureau.172   
 
The North Carolina Reinsurance Facility (Facility) is another key player in determining 
motor vehicle insurance rates for high-risk policyholders.  All fifty states and the District of 
Columbia have residual market laws to provide insurance coverage for high-risk drivers unable 
to secure insurance in the private market.  North Carolina has the largest state reinsurance facility 
in the nation.173  In North Carolina, every insurance company licensed to write motor vehicle 
insurance in the state is required to participate in the Reinsurance Facility—“a statutory 
reinsurance pool for the high-risk driver of motor vehicles.”174  The Facility allows any insurance 
company with doubts about the profitability of any policy to transfer it to the Facility, where the 
rates, on average, are 35 percent higher than voluntary rates offered by private insurers.  The cost 
to fund this insurance pool is borne by other North Carolina drivers—every insured driver in the 
state pays a hidden tax of about 6 percent.175  The Facility uses the tax to subsidize car insurance 
policies for high-risk drivers.176  Thus, the tax paid by North Carolinians is used to make up the 
difference between the subsidized rate and the amount that the risky drivers should pay.177  
b. Authority of the Commissioner of Insurance 
Article 2 of Chapter 58 of the North Carolina General Statute lays out the powers and 
duties of the commissioner of insurance.  Once the General Assembly has enacted legislation 
pertaining to the regulation of a particular insurance scheme, the Commissioner is authorized to 
adopt rules in order to “enforce, carry out and make effective the provisions of those laws.”  The 
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Commissioner has rulemaking authority in the execution of a specific law if its provisions are 
vague or otherwise unclear.178  The General Assembly may vest broad review powers in the 
Commissioner of Insurance.179  For example, the only power the Commissioner has to fix 
insurance rates is that which the General Assembly delegated to him.  The General Assembly 
vested broad review powers in the Commissioner to ensure that rates not be “unreasonable, 
inadequate, unfairly discriminatory nor harmful to the public interest.”180 
 
Any issue as to the existence of authority in the Department of Insurance is one of 
statutory construction.181  Thus, the General Assembly may confer upon the Commissioner 
additional powers for the regulation of gun liability insurance.  Alternatively, the General 
Assembly, itself, may choose to enact detailed rules for the implementation of an insurance 
requirement, thereby diminishing the Commissioners’ rulemaking authority.  
 
The Department of Insurance may interpret gun liability insurance legislation to include 
intentional acts by the insured, but only if a statute or some other law “specifically authorizes the 
agency to do so.”182  The more likely scenario is for the legislature to specify which acts are and 
are not covered under a particular insurance scheme.   
 
However, while the General Assembly is allowed to specify which acts ought to be 
covered under a certain scheme, it is not permitted to compel insurance companies to offer gun 
liability insurance to its policyholders; insurance providers may not be penalized for refusing to 
offer specific types of insurance.  In 1975, the General Assembly passed “An Act to Establish a 
Health Care Liability Reinsurance Exchange,” (“Act”) which required all insurers licensed in the 
state to issue general liability policies to supply health care liability insurance at their own 
risk.183   The Commissioner of Insurance issued several orders to enforce the provisions of the 
Act.184  Insurers in North Carolina brought forth several proceedings against the Commissioner, 
demanding judicial review of the Commissioner’s orders and that the Act be declared 
unconstitutional and void.185  In Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company v. Ingram, the 
Supreme Court of North Carolina found the Act to be unconstitutional.186  The court held that the 
General Assembly did not have the power to require insurance companies to offer health care 
liability insurance or to require companies to “engage in such a business as a condition to its 
right to continue to carry on an entirely different business for which it is duly licensed by the 
state and in which it wants to be, and is, engaged.”187  In holding that the Act violated the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and a state constitutional provision that “no person 
shall be deprived of his liberty by law of the land,” the Court found that to compel an insurance 
company, “against its will, to write health care insurance liability insurance for whatever health 
care provider may see fit to apply to it therefor would subject the company to a risk of a financial 
disaster.”188  Thus, while the General Assembly may enact a law mandating that insurers write 
gun liability insurance, neither the General Assembly nor the Commissioner may enforce it 
against insurers who choose not to offer it.  
 
VI. ALTERNATIVES 
I analyzed three important policy considerations: (1) whether the insurance mandate 
should apply to unintentional shootings or unintentional and intentional shootings, (2) whether 
the insurance mandate should apply to all gun owners or just concealed carry permit holders, and 
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(3) whether the insurance mandate should apply to all firearms or merely those purchased after 
the mandate has been enacted.   
a. Insurance Scheme Applies to Unintentional Shootings (Excluding Suicide) v. 
Unintentional and Intentional Shootings (Excluding Suicide) 
The proposed insurance scheme could cover injuries and deaths resulting from (1) only 
unintentional shootings or (2) unintentional and intentional shootings.   
Under (1), only victims of unintentional shootings will be entitled to benefits.  Language 
commonly found in insurance policies exclude bodily injury or property damage caused 
intentionally by the insured party.  This exclusionary language supports public policy interests 
against shielding a person from the financial and criminal consequences of intentional acts he or 
she commits.189  By placing financial responsibility on the party responsible rather than on the 
insurance company, “the public partially achieves its interests of punishing and deterring those 
acting against societal interests.”190  Other, albeit less important, public policy goals are also met 
by limiting liability insurance to unintentional acts.  Exclusionary language in liability insurance 
policies “puts insureds on notice that an otherwise compensable loss will not be covered if the 
insured intentionally commits an act that causes injury.”191    
Under (2), eligibility of benefits will not depend on the nature of the occurrence where 
the victim was injured or killed.  If a victim is injured or killed by any means other than suicide, 
he or she will be covered.   
Though exclusionary language in liability insurance policies satisfies some public policy 
goals, others are not met.  By denying coverage for intentional acts, victims may never be 
compensated for their injuries, especially if the policyholder lacks adequate personal financial 
resources.  Additionally, “the goal of spreading the risk and cost of injuries to all insurance 
policyholders is not realized by excluding intentional acts from insurance coverage.”192   
Currently, the only methods by which victims of intentional acts may receive 
compensation are through victims compensation programs or by initiating a civil suit against the 
perpetrator.  (See Appendix A).  An insurance mandate that provides coverage for unintentional 
and intentional acts would provide victims of intentional acts additional means to obtain 
compensation. 
In 2011, the 20 unintentional firearm deaths accounted for only 1.1 percent of all manners 
and methods of violent death in North Carolina.193  That same year, there were 519 homicides, 
accounting for nearly 29 percent of all manners and methods of violent death in North 
Carolina.194  The relative difference in the rate of homicide and accidental shootings is somewhat 
smaller for nonfatal injuries, but still large.  Thus, a much greater portion of gun violence victims 
would be covered under a gun liability scheme that provides coverage for both unintentional and 
assault injuries and deaths than for unintentional shootings alone.  Hence, public policy goals 
supporting coverage for intentional acts may outweigh policy interests in excluding coverage.    
 As with life insurance policies, the proposed gun liability scheme will not provide 
coverage for injuries, fatal or nonfatal, that are self-inflicted.  Permitting beneficiaries to collect 
 20 
insurance benefits after a policyholder’s suicide or attempted suicide encourages suicide and is 
thus contrary to the public interest.   
b. Insurance Scheme Applies to Carry Conceal Permit Holders v. All Gun 
Owners 
The proposed gun liability insurance scheme could be applied either to (1) concealed 
carry permit holders or (2) all gun owners.  Under (1), only concealed-carry permit holders 
would be required to obtain liability insurance for their firearms.   
Between December 1, 1995 and June 30, 2011, sheriffs across North Carolina issued 
228,072 concealed carry permits.195  Concealed permit holders are permitted to take their 
weapons into public places.  As of October 1, 2013, North Carolina permit holders are also 
allowed to bring their handguns into bars and restaurants, and public parks.196  As the areas 
where permit holders can bring their firearms expand, the risks to the community increase.  For 
example, permit holders often need to leave their firearms in cars or other less protected areas 
(when entering a place or building that prohibits firearms) thereby encouraging theft and 
potential misuse.197  Concealed weapons create an environment where more innocent bystanders 
could get shot during altercations.  Unlike individuals who acquire firearms for home-defense or 
for sport, concealed carry holders expose a greater number of people to the dangers of firearms.   
 Alternatively, instead of requiring merely concealed carry permit holders to acquire 
liability insurance, all firearm owners in North Carolina could be required to obtain insurance for 
their weapons.  Although a precise estimate of how many gun owners reside in North Carolina is 
unknown, the National Instant Criminal Background Check System conducted 574,662 firearm 
background checks in North Carolina in 2013 alone.198  Because federal law does not require 
background checks for private gun sales, it is likely that far more firearms are in circulation than 
NICS indicates.   
c. Insurance Scheme Applies to Gun Purchases After Date of Enactment v. All 
Guns  
 The proposed gun liability insurance scheme could be applied either to (1) all gun 
purchases after the scheme is enacted or (2) to all firearms.  Under (1), firearm owners would be 
required to show proof of insurance at the time of sale.  If a potential buyer fails to demonstrate 
proof of gun liability insurance, he or she will be prohibited from purchasing the firearm.  
Firearms purchased before the date of enactment would not be required to be insured.   
Alternatively, under (2), the insurance scheme would apply retroactively.  North Carolina 
gun owners would be required to maintain insurance for all firearms purchased before and after 
the date of enactment.  A penalty would be imposed on gun owners who fail to acquire liability 
insurance for their firearms.   
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VII. CRITERIA 
 
a. Cost benefit analysis: Maximize compensation to victims of gun violence and 
reduce gun violence and minimize administrative costs of the insurance mandate. 
One of the primary goals of gun liability insurance is to provide financial protection 
against bodily injury and death sustained by firearms and against any liability that could also 
arise therefrom.  Although victims of gun violence currently have some means for compensation, 
such as homeowners insurance and victims compensations programs, they are insufficient.  Thus, 
the insurance scheme should attempt to expand monetary compensation for victims of gun 
violence and their families. 
A secondary goal of mandatory gun liability insurance is to reduce the risks accompanied 
with firearms.  On the one hand, the cost of acquiring insurance could deter some individuals 
from purchasing firearms.  At the very least, high-risk firearm owners could be deterred as 
premiums would presumably increase for individuals who own multiple firearms or fail to 
properly store their firearms.  
The administrative costs to insurers and the costs to gun owners must also be taken into 
consideration before this mandate can be implemented.  A policy option will meet this criterion 
if the benefits associated with maximizing compensation to gun violence victims and reducing 
gun violence is greater than the costs to insurers and gun owners.   
b. Maximize political feasibility 
Any policy change involving firearms is likely to generate some resistance from gun 
owners.  Proposals to implement gun liability schemes have been introduced in several states; 
however, all bills have failed to progress.  (See Table 3).  Political feasibility in this case refers to 
the extent to which policymakers, insurance companies, and the general public would be willing 
to accept and support gun liability insurance.  Any successful mandate must be palatable enough 
to be passed by the North Carolina General Assembly and approved by the Governor and general 
public.  Because Republicans have control of both houses in the North Carolina General 
Assembly and the governorship, a successful proposal must have some Republican support.   
c. Constitutionality 
In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court ruled that the Second Amendment 
confers an individual right to possess a firearm for traditionally lawful purposes, such as self-
defense within the home.199  In Heller, the Court asserted that total ban on handguns in the home 
was unconstitutional.   However, the Court also explicitly noted that the right to bear arms is not 
unlimited: “[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions 
on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of 
firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing 
conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.”200  By calling these public safety 
exceptions as “presumptively lawful,”201 the Court in Heller appeared to reject strict scrutiny, 
which presumes that challenged laws are unconstitutional.202 
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Despite the failure of the Supreme Court to provide adequate guidance to lower courts on 
resolving gun control controversies, lower courts have almost always upheld the constitutionality 
of gun laws.  Since Heller, federal and state courts have ruled on Second Amendment challenges 
in over 500 cases, with the government successfully defending gun regulations in nearly every 
case.203  Lower federal courts have attempted to provide a framework for evaluating the 
constitutionality of firearm regulations:  
 
Some regulations, primarily those that are “longstanding,” are presumed not to 
infringe the right protected by the Second Amendment.  Regulations that severely 
restrict the core right of self defense are subject to “strict scrutiny,” meaning that 
they will not be upheld unless they are narrowly tailored to promote public safety 
without putting unnecessary burdens on individual citizens.  Regulations that do 
not several restrict the core right of self-defense are subject to “intermediate 
scrutiny,” meaning that the government must demonstrate that the regulation is 
well suited to advance the public interest in preventing the misuse of guns.204   
 
In the wake of the Heller decision, the District of Columbia applied a form of 
intermediate scrutiny that was “highly deferential to legislative determinations”205 and upheld 
several provisions, including detailed registration requirements, which mandated applicants to 
submit to fingerprinting, firearms training, and a vision test.206  Indeed, the emerging trend is 
toward intermediate scrutiny, especially for cases where the challenged law falls outside of the 
core right identified in Heller.   
Thus, at the minimum, any gun liability insurance proposal should “advance the public 
interest in preventing the misuse of guns,”207 thereby minimizing the possibility of infringement 
on individuals’ Second Amendment right to possess a firearm. 
VIII. ANALYSIS 
This section evaluates the strength of each of the policy options discussed in Part VI 
under each of the criteria in Part VII.   
a. Insurance Scheme Applies to Unintentional Shootings (Excluding Suicide) v. 
Unintentional and Intentional Shootings (Excluding Suicide) 
 
i. Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Unintentional shootings comprise a statistically small fraction of all firearm related 
injuries and deaths.  In 2011, there were roughly 3,053 victims of gun-related assaults and 
homicides and 500 victims of accidental shootings.  (See Table 2).  Substantially more gun 
violence victims would be eligible for compensation if the insurance mandate provided coverage 
for both intentional and unintentional shootings.  (See Appendix A).   
As previously discussed, standard homeowners insurance policies typically cover 
accidental injuries or property damage resulting from firearms.  However, injuries sustained by 
the insured or anyone in the insured’s household are not covered under homeowners insurance 
policies.  (See Appendix A).  And, given that nearly 47 percent (national average) of all 
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unintentional shooting victims are family members,208 a substantial portion of these victims will 
not be covered under homeowners insurance since they are likely part of the policyholder’s 
household.   
For intentional injuries there is a significantly larger gap in coverage.  Unlike 
unintentional shootings, injuries or property damage sustained by the intentional use of a firearm 
are not covered under standard homeowners insurance policies.  Under homeowners insurance 
policies, there was no financial recourse for the 3,053 victims of gun-related assaults and 
homicides in 2011.  (See Table 2).  Although some victims may have received some monetary 
relief through the North Carolina Victims Compensations Services, the assistance would have 
been nominal.     
The basic administrative costs of implementing a gun liability insurance scheme include 
staff costs (e.g. salaries, training), buildings and equipment, information technology 
maintenance, and utility charges and other operational expenses (e.g., paper, printing 
material).209  Insurers generate costs in calculating premiums, processing applications and 
verifying and investigating claims.  It is likely that administrative costs will be higher if both 
unintentional and intentional shootings are covered, than if only unintentional shootings are 
covered.  The total number of claims, and thus the total incurred losses to insurers (which will be 
passed onto policyholders) is likely to be larger if the mandate provides coverage for 
unintentional and intentional shootings, suggesting that administrative costs will be higher under 
a mandate that covers both types of incidents.     
Additionally, the average premium a North Carolina gun owner would have to pay would 
be higher if the mandate covered unintentional and intentional injuries and deaths.  If the same 
loss to premium ratio for automobile insurance is applied to gun liability insurance (.642),210 
with an average insurance claim of $30,000 for non-fatal injuries and $200,000 for fatal injuries, 
the approximately 1,198,449 North Carolina gun owners would pay $23.91 if only unintentional 
injuries and fatalities were covered,iv and $257.62 if both unintentional and intentional injuries 
and fatalities were covered.v   
                                                
iv To calculate the average premium for gun owners (for unintentional injuries), I first had to estimate the total 
amount of claims that would be made.  A $30,000 payout for non-fatal injuries and a $200,000 payout for fatal 
injuries would result in total insurance claims of $18,400,000 (($200,000 x annual number of fatal unintentional 
injuries resulting from firearms) + ($30,000 x annual number of nonfatal injuries resulting from firearms) = 
($200,000 x 20 fatal unintentional injuries resulting from firearms) + ($30,000 x 480 nonfatal unintentional injuries) 
= $18,400,000.  If the same loss to premium ratio that is applied to automobile insurance (.642) is applied to gun 
liability insurance, the premiums for unintentional injuries would total $28,660,000 (total premiums = total claims ÷ 
loss to premium ratio = $18,400,000 ÷ .62 = $28,660,000).  To calculate the average premium for each gun owner, I 
divided the total amount collected in premiums by the estimated number of gun owners ($28,660,000 ÷ 1,198,449 = 
$23.91).   
v To calculate the average premium for gun owners (for unintentional and intentional injuries), I first had to estimate 
the total amount of claims that would be made.  A $30,000 payout for non-fatal injuries and a $200,000 payout for 
fatal injuries would result in total insurance claims of $198,220,000 (($200,000 x annual number of fatal intentional 
and unintentional injuries resulting from firearms) + ($30,000 x annual number of nonfatal intentional and 
unintentional injuries resulting from firearms) = ($200,000 x 539 fatal intentional and unintentional injuries 
resulting from firearms) + ($30,000 x 3,014) = $198,220,000.  If the same loss to premium ratio that is applied to 
automobile insurance (.642) is applied to gun liability insurance, the premiums for intentional and unintentional 
injuries would total $308,753,000 (total premiums = total claims ÷ loss to premium ratio = $198,220,000 ÷ .62 = 
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To maximize coverage for gun violence victims, the mandate should provide coverage 
for both unintentional and intentional shooting victims.  However, this type of coverage would 
be significantly more expensive for gun owners than if only unintentional shootings were 
covered.   
ii. Maximize Political Feasibility 
Gun liability insurance bills are not popular.  Bills requiring firearm liability insurance 
for gun owners have been introduced in several sates, but have faced an uphill battle.  (See Table 
3).  Despite repeated attempts, a gun liability insurance mandate has yet to pass in any state.  
According to the National Council of State Legislatures, in the past decade, approximately 20 
such bills have been turned down at the state level.211   
Table 3: State Survey, Gun Liability Insurance 
State Type of Act Covered Status 
Massachusetts Accidental Pending 
Maryland Accidental Died in Judicial Proceedings 
Committee 
New York Intentional or Accidental Referred to Insurance 
Committee 
Illinois Negligent or Willful Re-referred to Rules 
Committee 
Connecticut Intentional or Accidental Died in Insurance Committee 
Pennsylvania Intentional or Negligent, but 
not Unlawful 
Referred to Judiciary 
Committee 
Washington, DC Negligent or Willful Referred to the Committee on 
the Judiciary and Public 
Safety 
North Carolina Negligent or Willful Referred to Committee on 
Rules, Calendar, and 
Operations 
Source: Young Ha and Don Jergler, Gun Liability Insurance Measures Facing Uphill Battle in State Legislatures, Insurance Journal (Apr. 12, 
2013), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2013/04/12/287975.htm; H.B. 976, Session 2013 (Nc. 2013), 
http://www.ncleg.net/Sessions/2013/Bills/House/PDF/H976v1.pdf. 
An insurance mandate that applies only to unintentional shootings has a far greater 
likelihood of passage in the General Assembly than one that applies to both intentional shootings 
and unintentional shootings.  Injuries and property damage resulting from criminal acts are 
explicitly excluded from personal liability policies.  Traditionally, “recovery for losses caused by 
intentional acts of the insured has . . . been thought to be inconsistent with public policy.”212  
Insurance experts argue that proposals that would allow recovery for such losses encourage 
conduct that is “socially undesirable”213 and “economically wasteful.”214  
                                                                                                                                                       
$308,753,000).  To calculate the average premium for each gun owner, I divided the total amount collected in 
premiums by the estimated number of gun owners ($308,753,000 ÷ 1,198,449 = $23.91).   
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The insurance industry has vocally opposed liability insurance for intentional acts.  
Insurance companies fear the “moral hazard” that gun liability insurance for intentional 
shootings would create: a shooter who knows (1) that he is indemnified for the damages flowing 
from intentionally shooting another and (2) that the insurer will have to defend him if he is sued, 
will have a greater incentive to commit violent acts with firearms.215  This reasoning makes a 
major assumption: that without insurance, these wrongdoers would tap into their own financial 
resources to compensate their victims.  Insuring intentional assaults are unlikely to raise the 
moral hazard problem, given that individuals who engage in criminal conduct will be unable to 
profit from their intentional behavior.  In precluding coverage for intentional acts, the insured 
can shirk his personal responsibility to pay for the victim’s losses.216  However, in paying the 
criminal insured, the insurer, “is actually primarily benefitting the injured accident victim and 
not the criminal insured, who will likely not have sufficient assets to satisfy a judgment in 
[favor] of the victim.”217  Because “assuring compensation to victims remains a principal goal of 
the [insurance] system,” denying coverage for losses incurred as a result of intentional acts is 
undesirable.218   
In 2013, Rep. Carolyn Maloney filed the Firearms Risk Protection Act of 2013, which 
would require gun owners to acquire liability coverage and to show proof of that coverage when 
they purchase a gun.219  In response, the American Insurance Association issued a statement 
asserting that mandatory liability insurance for intentional acts “misunderstand a fundamental 
principle of insurance-that it is designed to cover fortuitous, or accidental events; not intentional 
conduct.  Property/casualty insurance does not and cannot cover intentional behavior such as 
criminal acts.”220  A spokesperson from the Massachusetts Insurance Federation also expressed 
concern, stating that “ . . . the potential may exist that [mandatory gun ownership liability 
coverage] would unintentionally or inadvertently encourage poor behavior in terms of gun 
usage.”221  However, the insurance industry’s concerns are misguided given that some insurance 
schemes, specifically automobile insurance is designed to cover intentional acts and protect the 
victim; the intent of the aggressor has been deemed irrelevant.222  Thus, automobile insurance 
will likely indemnify a driver who uses his vehicle as a dangerous instrumentality to 
intentionally run down a pedestrian or another motorist.223   
The insurance industry is also opposed to liability insurance for unintentional acts, 
arguing that homeowners’ insurance policies already protect against accidental damages, making 
a separate insurance mandate unnecessary.  Although offering liability insurance for firearms 
could be profitable for insurers, the insurance industry fears additional government oversight and 
regulation of prices.224   
This mandate is also likely to be unpopular in the General Assembly.  For the first time in 
nearly a century, Republicans took control of both the General Assembly and the Governor’s 
office.  Since taking control, the General Assembly has expanded gun rights laws.  For example, 
Session Law 2013-369 expanded the areas where concealed carry permit-holders could carry 
firearms. Permit holders can now carry their firearms into restaurants and bars that serve alcohol. 
225  The measure also allowed permit holders to carry firearms in parks and parades, and to store 
weapons in locked vehicles on public school grounds.226  Although this legislation did face some 
resistance, it passed 74-42.227   
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In April 2013, Democratic representatives in the House introduced the “Gun Safety Act,” 
which, among other changes, requires gun owners to acquire gun liability insurance.228  It has 
remained in the House Committee on Rules, Calendar, and Operations since April 18, 2013.229  
Given the current political climate in North Carolina, it is unlikely that any mandate that requires 
gun owners to pay an insurance premium for gun ownership would pass the General Assembly.   
iii. Constitutionality 
A law that requires gun owners to obtain liability insurance to cover injuries and property 
damage from unintentional shootings is likely to pass constitutional muster if it is not 
prohibitively expensive.  In Heller, the law in question banned gun owners from possessing 
handguns in the home.  In striking down the law, the Court stated that the ban amounted to a 
“prohibition of an entire class of ‘arms’” in the home, “where the need for defense of self, 
family, and property is most acute.”230  The mandate would not bar any law-abiding North 
Carolinian from possessing a firearm in the home, or otherwise, nor ban any particular type of 
firearm.  In fact, the mandate would not stop anyone from legally possessing as many firearms as 
they would like.  If a person chooses to accumulate a personal arsenal, then he or she will merely 
have to pay a higher premium.   
In some ways, premiums for gun liability insurance resemble taxes on firearms.  In 2013, 
Cook County, Illinois implemented a $25-per-gun-tax, called a “violence tax” to help defer the 
costs of treating gun shot victims in Cook County.231  Other socially prescribed goods and 
services, like alcohol and tobacco, are taxed by the federal government.  However, unlike the 
right to bear arms, there is no constitutional right that permits a person to smoke or drink alcohol.  
Gun rights advocates have expressed concern that gun taxes will “[penalize] law-abiding gun 
owners for exercising a constitutionally protected civil right.”232   
Additionally, while the General Assembly can pass a law requiring gun owners to possess 
liability insurance to provide coverage for unintentional and intentional injuries caused by 
firearm use and misuse, they may not compel insurance providers to offer such insurance.  
Penalizing gun owners for not obtaining liability insurance, when no insurance company 
provides such coverage would be problematic, as it would constitute a de facto ban on gun 
ownership.   
Even if insurance providers offered liability insurance for gun owners, the premiums 
would have be affordable; courts might conclude that a mandate that makes it prohibitively 
expensive to own a gun is unduly burdensome and, therefore, unconstitutional.   
b. Insurance Scheme Applies to Concealed Carry Permit Holders v. All Gun 
Owners 
 
i. Cost-Benefit Analysis 
The benefits of the mandate applying to all gun owners would outweigh the benefits of 
the mandate applying to only concealed carry permit holders.  By the close of 2011, there were 
more than 240,000 gun owners in North Carolina with a permit to carry a concealed weapon.233  
 27 
No one knows with certainty how many of North Carolina’s households own guns or how 
many guns are in circulation in the Sate.  In 2010, the General Social Survey estimated that 
approximately 32 percent of households in the United States owned at least one firearm.234  That 
same year, there were approximately 3,745,155 households in North Carolina.235  Thus, at the 
very minimum, there are 1,198,449 gun owners in North Carolina.vi  
There is much debate over whether laws that permit individuals to carry concealed 
weapons reduce crime.  However, some evidence does suggest that gun owners who own 
concealed-carry permits are responsible for fewer gun accidents and assaults than gun owners 
who do not possess a permit.  Over the course of five years (2007-2011), roughly 60 concealed 
carry permit holders committed a weapon-related assault.236  In 2011 alone, North Carolina 
witnessed over 3,000 fatal and nonfatal gun assaults.  (See Table 2).  Based on these statistics, it 
is evident that a significant number of gun-related assaults are committed by gun owners who do 
not possess a concealed carry permit.  In order to provide coverage for a greater number of gun 
violence victims, the mandate should apply to all gun owners and not just gun owners who 
possess a concealed carry permit.    
The costs of providing insurance coverage to all gun owners would be higher than 
providing coverage for concealed carry permit holders alone.  The total number of claims and the 
average administrative cost per claim is likely to be larger if all gun owners are insured than if 
only concealed carry permit holders are insured.  Given that gun owners who do not possess a 
concealed carry permit commit a greater number of weapons-related assaults, insurance 
companies will likely have fewer claims to pay out for permit holders.  Accordingly, the costs 
incurred by insurers and, therefore, policyholders, would be lower if only incidents by concealed 
carry permit holders were covered.  
ii. Maximize Political Feasibility 
Mandating gun liability insurance for concealed-carry permit holders is far more 
politically feasible than mandating insurance for all gun owners.  The privacy concerns inherent 
in acquiring liability insurance are alleviated for permit holders.  North Carolina permit holders 
are registered with state government agencies.  N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-415.17 (b) requires the 
sheriff to maintain a list, including the identifying information, of all those issued a permit.  
After the permit is issued, the sheriff must then send a copy of the permit to the State Bureau of 
Investigation then makes the list available to law enforcement officers and clerks of court on a 
statewide system.  Because permit holders are already registered with the sheriff and the State 
Bureau of Investigation, there would be no need for an additional registration system. 
Prior to obtaining a concealed carry permit, individuals must go undergo a thorough 
background check.  An applicant must provide the sheriff’s office with two sets of fingerprints, 
successfully complete an approved handgun safety course, and not suffer from any physician or 
mental infirmity that that would prevent the safe handling of a firearm.237  The sheriff must deny 
an application for a permit under several circumstances, including if the applicant has ever been 
                                                
vi To calculate the number of households in North Carolina that owned at least one firearm, I multiplied the number 
of households in North Carolina with the national percentage of American households that reported owning a 
firearm.   
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adjudicated guilty of a felony, is an unlawful user of marijuana or any other controlled substance, 
or has been discharged from the U.S. armed forces under conditions other than honorable.238   
Given this thorough background check process, permit holders are generally responsible 
individuals who have demonstrated their willingness to cooperate with government regulation.239  
Accordingly, insurers will find this class of gun owners far more desirable than gun owners who 
have not taken a handgun safety course or submit to a background check.   
iii. Constitutionality 
An insurance scheme that applies to a limited class of gun owners that is already subject 
to regulation is more likely to pass constitutional muster than one that applies to all gun owners.  
In Heller, the Court characterized several firearms regulations that are “presumptively lawful,” 
including “prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons” and “prohibitions on the possessions of 
firearms by felons and the mentally ill.”240  State and federal courts across the nation that have 
heard challenges to concealed carry laws have upheld the regulation in every case.241  For 
example, the Maryland Court of Appeals upheld a state law that banned the wearing, carrying, or 
transporting of a handgun without a permit and when outside of one’s home, and definitively 
rejected any suggestion that Heller applied beyond the home.242  The Fourth Circuit recently 
noted, “[A]s we move outside the home, firearms rights have always been more limited, because 
the public safety interests often outweigh the individual interests in self-defense.”243     
 
Additionally, Article I, Section 30, of the North Carolina Constitution provides the same 
general right to bear arms as the Second Amendment but also clarifies that “[n]othing herein 
shall justify the practice of carrying concealed weapons, or prevent the General Assembly from 
enacting penal statutes against that practice.”244  Requiring gun owners to obtain liability 
insurance to carry a concealed weapon should certainly be upheld if a blanket ban on carrying 
concealed weapons is deemed constitutional.  Indeed, North Carolinians already pay a nominal 
fee to acquire a concealed carry permit;245 an insurance premium is effectively a fee paid by 
concealed carry permit holders. 
 
The constitutionality of a liability insurance mandate that applies to all gun owners is far 
less clear.  For the mandate to meet an intermediate standard of review, it must be substantially 
related to an important government interest.246  The government has a compelling interest in 
preventing firearm deaths and avoiding serious injuries through an insurance scheme that 
encourages safe firearm use and discourages risky behavior, such as not storing firearms 
properly.  A mandate that applied to all gun owners could be upheld if the premiums offered to 
gun owners are not prohibitively expensive so as to effectively make it impossible for individuals 
to possess firearms without violating the law.   
 
c. Insurance Scheme Applies to Gun Purchases After Date of Enactment v. All 
Guns 
 
i. Cost-Benefit Analysis 
If the mandate were to apply to firearms purchased after the date of enactment, a 
significantly small portion of gun injuries and deaths would be covered.  Since the goal of the 
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mandate is to provide compensation to as many gun violence victims as feasible, it should apply 
to all firearms in circulation in North Carolina.  However, insurers are likely to face a greater 
number of claims, and thus higher costs for processing the claims, under a mandate that provides 
coverage for all firearms.  
ii. Maximize Political Feasibility 
Requiring gun owners to acquire insurance for new firearms purchased after the date of 
enactment is likely to be more politically feasible than one that requires insurance for all firearms 
purchased prior to the effective date.  Far more individuals will be implicated by this mandate if 
it applies to all firearms, even those purchased prior to the date of enactment.   
In January 2013, SurveyUSA conducted a poll of 500 North Carolina adults.   The results 
indicated that North Carolinians believe that the right of Americans to own firearms (54 percent) 
is more important than regulating gun ownership (38 percent); widespread gun ownership 
protects more law abiding citizens from crime (58 percent) than makes society more dangerous 
(34 percent); stricter enforcement of existing gun control laws (63 percent) is a better way to 
reduce gun violence than passing stricter laws (32 percent).247  When asked which one act would 
be most effective in reducing school shootings, respondents believed that better security (41 
percent) and not making guns more difficult to access would be most effective.248  There was, 
however, overwhelming support for background checks for gun purchases (94 percent) and the 
need for the government to offer additional services for mental health problems (81 percent).249  
The poll indicates that although North Carolinians desire some change in the state’s gun laws, 
namely to improve background checks and increased services for the mentally ill, on other 
issues, they are more resistant to restrictions.  Thus, it is unlikely that North Carolinians would 
support a mandate that would make gun ownership more expensive.   
Additionally, it is unlikely that the mandate has the support it needs in the General 
Assembly.  Sen. Phil Berger, the president pro tempore of the Republican-controlled state Senate 
stated, “I do not see this General Assembly doing anything to impair the rights, the constitutional 
rights of law-abiding citizens in North Carolina to have access to the things that are guaranteed 
to them by the Second Amendment.”250  Even if the mandate is deemed to be constitutional, it is 
unlikely that it will have the political and public support to get passed. 
iii. Constitutionality 
An insurance scheme that applies to firearm purchases after date of enactment and one 
that applies to all firearms would both be deemed constitutional.  If the far more restrictive 
option—a mandate that applies to current firearms—would pass constitutional muster, then a 
proposal that includes a grandfather clause that exempts current firearms in circulation and 
applies only to future firearm purchases will surely be constitutional. 
 
Courts have upheld a number of statutes that applied to firearms purchased prior to the 
date of enactment.  For example, on January 15, 2013, New York’s Governor, Andrew Cuomo, 
signed into law the New York Secure Ammunition and Firearms Enforcement Act of 2013 (the 
SAFE Act).251  Although New York banned assault weapons in 2000, the SAFE Act expanded 
the criteria for determining what constitutes an “assault weapon.” 252   Subject to certain 
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exemptions, the possession of such firearms constitutes a Class D felony.253  While current 
owners of these weapons were permitted to keep them, they were required to register them, or 
sell them to firearm dealers or out-of-state buyers.254  The SAFE Act also made it unlawful to 
possess all large-capacity magazines that held more than 10 rounds of ammunition, regardless of 
their date of manufacture.255  The Act eliminated the “grandfather” clause, which had exempted 
large-capacity magazines that were manufactured before September 13, 1994.256  The United 
States District Court for the Western District of New York upheld both regulations, despite the 
fact that the regulations applied to current assault weapon owners and large-capacity magazines 
manufactured years prior to the enactment of the SAFE Act.257  In applying intermediate 
scrutiny, the court upheld the regulations and concluded that the provisions did not violate the 
Second Amendment because there was a substantial link between the SAFE Act’s restrictions on 
large-capacity magazines and assault weapons, and New York’s compelling interest in public 
safety.258  
 
If the North Carolina General Assembly passed a mandate that would require gun owners 
to purchase liability insurance for firearms they purchased prior to the date of enactment, it is 
likely that it would be constitutional.  Indeed, this mandate is far less restrictive than the SAFE 
Act that passed constitutional muster.   
 
IX. RECOMMENDATION  
As the analysis indicates, among the criteria discussed, constitutionality is likely the 
easiest to accomplish.  Each policy option would pass constitutional muster since neither option 
would interfere with an individual’s right to possess firearms for lawful use.     
 
North Carolinians disagree on many of the proposals to regulate gun ownership.  Hence, 
the more expansive policy options—providing coverage for unintentional and intentional 
shootings, requiring all gun owners to acquire liability insurance, and applying the mandate to all 
firearms—are likely to generate greater opposition from lawmakers and insurers.  Although the 
narrower, more restrictive options—providing coverage for unintentional shootings only, 
requiring only concealed carry permit holders to acquire liability insurance, and applying the 
mandate to firearms purchased after the insurance scheme is enacted—are more politically 
feasible, they may not necessarily be options that ought to be implemented. 
 
Arguably the most important criterion is whether the benefits of implementing these 
policy options are greater than the costs.  A mandate that provides coverage for a greater number 
of incidents is preferred, when taking into account injuries and fatalities prevented and victim 
compensation.  The costs to insurers and policyholders are likely to be small in comparison to 
the value of lives saved and the reduced risks associated with the possibility of losing one’s 
livelihood as a result of being shot.  
 
Accordingly, I recommend that the gun liability insurance scheme (1) cover injuries and 
deaths from intentional and unintentional shootings, (2) apply to concealed carry permit holders 
only, and (3) apply to all firearms, purchased before and after the date of enactment.   
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X. MOVING FORWARD 
 
The purpose of this paper was to provide a framework to better understand the gap in 
compensation for gun violence victims and to determine the scope of gun liability insurance.  
Before any gun liability scheme can be implemented in North Carolina, several more issues need 
to be resolved.  For example, should the mandate provide compensation for pain and suffering, 
or merely medical expenses and funeral costs?  What factors should insurance providers take into 
account when setting premiums?  Should the mandate be modeled after victims compensation 
programs or the tort system?     
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Appendix A 
 
Methods for Compensation for Victims of Gun Violence 
Occurrence Homeowners Insurance 
Motor 
Vehicle 
Insurance 
NRA 
Insurance 
Civil 
Liability 
(Assault & 
Battery or 
Negligence) 
 
North 
Carolina 
Crimes 
Victims 
Compensation 
Gun Liability 
Insurance 
(Unintentional 
Injuries and 
Fatalities) 
Gun Liability 
Insurance 
(Unintentional 
and 
Intentional 
Injuries and 
Fatalities) 
A accidently 
injures B 
(neighbor) 
in A’s home 
with a 
firearm. 
Yes No 
No.  Liability 
insurance 
only covers 
injuries 
sustained 
while 
hunting, 
trapping, at 
shooting 
competitions, 
or at private 
shooting 
ranges. 
Yes 
No.  The 
program only 
provides 
compensation 
for victims of 
criminal acts. 
Yes Yes 
A accidently 
injures B, a 
member of 
A’s 
household, 
in A’s home 
with a 
firearm. 
No.  Injuries 
sustained by 
the 
policyholder 
or anyone in 
the 
policyholder’s 
household are 
not covered 
under 
homeowners 
insurance. 
No 
No.  Liability 
insurance 
only covers 
injuries 
sustained 
while 
hunting, 
trapping, at 
shooting 
competitions, 
or at private 
shooting 
ranges. 
Yes 
No.  The 
program only 
provides 
compensation 
for victims of 
criminal acts. 
Yes Yes 
A 
intentionally 
shoots and 
injures B 
(neighbor) 
in A’s home 
with a 
firearm. 
No.  
Intentional 
acts are not 
covered under 
homeowners 
insurance. 
No 
No.  Liability 
insurance 
does not 
cover 
intention 
shootings.  
Yes Yes No Yes 
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A 
intentionally 
shoots and 
injures B, a 
member of 
A’s 
household, 
in A’s home 
with a 
firearm. 
No.  
Intentional 
acts are not 
covered under 
homeowners 
insurance.  
Injuries 
sustained by 
the 
policyholder 
or anyone in 
the 
policyholder’s 
household are 
not covered 
under 
homeowners 
insurance. 
No 
No.   
Liability 
insurance 
does not 
cover 
intention 
shootings. 
Yes Yes No 
 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
 
A 
intentionally 
fires a gun 
toward B, 
outside the 
premises of 
A’s home, 
not 
intending to 
injure B.  B 
is shot and 
injured. 
Yes No 
No.   
Liability 
insurance 
does not 
cover 
intention 
shootings. 
Yes Maybe 
Likely.  The 
mandate can be 
drafted so as to 
include 
unintentional 
injuries caused 
by intentional 
acts. 
Yes 
A accidently 
injuries B 
while 
hunting. 
Yes No Yes Yes 
No.  The 
program only 
provides 
compensation 
for victims of 
criminal acts. 
Yes Yes 
A 
intentionally 
injures B 
while 
hunting. 
No No 
No.   
Liability 
insurance 
does not 
cover 
intention 
shootings.  
Yes Yes No Yes 
 34 
 
 
 
A’s 16-year-
old son 
takes A’s 
rifle and 
accidently 
injuries B, 
while 
hunting. 
Yes No 
No.  Liability 
insurance 
only applies 
to the 
individual 
who 
purchased 
the 
insurance. 
Yes 
No.  The 
program only 
provides 
compensation 
for victims of 
criminal acts. 
Yes Yes 
A injures B 
when rifle 
accidently 
discharges 
while being 
removed 
from A’s 
motor 
vehicle. 
Yes, provided 
that the use, 
loading or 
unloading of 
the motor 
vehicle is not 
the efficient 
and 
predominating 
cause of the 
injury. 
Yes, if the 
transportation 
of the firearm 
was an 
ordinary and 
customary 
use of the 
motor 
vehicle. 
No.  Liability 
insurance 
only covers 
injuries 
sustained 
while 
hunting, 
trapping, at 
shooting 
competitions, 
or at private 
shooting 
ranges. 
Yes 
No.  The 
program only 
provides 
compensation 
for victims of 
criminal acts. 
Likely.  The 
mandate can be 
drafted so as to 
include 
unintentional 
injuries caused 
by intentional 
acts 
Yes 
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